The Interpretation of the N. I. L. and Statutes Declaring Instruments Void by Beutel, Frederick K.
April, z935
THE INTERPRETATION OF THE N. I. L. AND STATUTES
DECLARING INSTRUMENTS VOID
FREDERICK K. BEUTELt
When a legislature has declared that certain acts or activities resulting
in agreements are socially undesirable and therefore tainted with illegality,
a number of results may follow. So far as their enforcement is concerned
agreements made contrary to such statutes may be illegal, voidable or void.
The standard texts have it that if they are "merely illegal" they are
unenforceable between the parties; if "voidable" they may be enforced unless
the injured party objects; but if "void" they are of no effect at all.1 As long
as the interests of the original parties and the purpose of the legislative
command which is usually enacted with them in mind are involved, this
classification is satisfactory enough; but when the prohibited, illegal, or void
act touches third persons, this analysis needs further examination.
One of the most interesting of such situations, and one which seems to
have caused much confusion, apparent as well as real, in the decisions, is that
in which the interests of a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument
run counter to a statute declaring the instrument which he has purchased
defective because, at some point in its life, either at inception or transfer,
some of its apparent parties have violated the legislative command.
Since the holder in due course is an especially favored party, mere ille-
gality is seldom recognized as a defense against him.2 So also the right to
avoid is usually restricted to the immediate parties to the transaction, but the
holder in due course is allowed to recover in almost all cases.3
The real difficulties arise in those cases where the legislature in its
wisdom has seen fit to declare that the instrument, because of the part which
it has played in the prohibited transaction, is "void", or has employed some
t A. B., 1921, Cornell University; LL. B., 1925, S.J.D., 1928, Harvard University;
editor, BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) ; Professor of Law, Tulane
University.
I. 2 WITUTsToN, CoNTRAcrs (1920) § 1159; 3 id. §§ 1628-163o; I DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) §§ 227, 229; BYLES, BILLS (4th Am. ed. 1856) 205; STORY,
BILLS OF EXCHANGE (2d ed. 1846) §§ 189, "19o.
2. For an excellent discussion of the common law on this point see DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS (4th ed. 1891) § 187 et seq.; STORY, loc. cit. supra note I. For cases since the
Act to the same effect, see BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (5th ed. 1932) 555 et
seq., and authorities there cited; Note L. R. A. I918C 775 et seq.
3. The cases involving incapacity, especially that of infancy, form an exception to this
rule. See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 22; BRANNAN, op. Cit. supra note 2, at 277 et
seq.; cf. SALES ACT § 24. The reasons for the exceptions as to capacity are discussed infra
P. 763. But where the instrument is voidable for illegality, the rule is as stated. Bank of
of Youngsville v. Hunt, 188 N. C. 377, 124 S. E. 854 (1924).
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synonymous expression.' This paper will be devoted entirely to discussing
this aspect of the general problem.
The Meaning of the Term "Void" as Used by Legislatures
The expression "void" and its equivalents, as distinguished from "void-
able", are usually taken to mean entirely without effect, but a reference to any
standard legal dictionary 5 will reveal that even the courts, to say nothing
of legislatures, do not always make the distinction.
The courts and legislatures are prone to use such expressions as "void
between the parties", 6 "absolutely void",' "void between the parties and their
assigns"," "void as to all subsequent parties" 9 and the like. In fact it was
not until the late nineteenth century that a clear distinction between void and
voidable, null and nullable appeared in such carefully drawn legislation as
the civil codes of European countries.' It can hardly be expected, therefore,
that an American legislature made up of politicians, rural lawyers, farmers
and business men could use the term "void" in an accurate sense to mean
"absolutely without effect as to any parties", "entirely null" or the like. Any
person who applies such an a priori meaning to the term is guilty of a type
of naive logolatry which does irreparable damage to the true legislative intent.
Prima facie then, when a statute declares an instrument void it may be
taken to mean one of at least two things: narrowly interpreted, unenforce-
4. See IoWA CODE (I Ii) § 9407: "If it shall be ascertained in any action brought on a=y
contract . . . and in nw case where unlawful interest is contracted for shall the plaintiff
have judgment for more than the principal sum" (italics added) ; ALA. CODE (1928) § 8567:
"and cannot be enforced either at law or in equity. . . . Nor shall the borrower
ever in any case in law or equity be required to pay".
5. 1 BoIJvEaR, LAW DICrioNARY (3d ed. 1914) 34o6 et seq.; BLAcK, LAW DicTioNARY (2d
ed. 1933) 1822 ; SHUIMAKER AND LoNGSDORF, CYcLOPEDic LAW DICTIONARY (2d ed. i922)
I064.
6. See 2 OXaoN CODE (1930) §§ 43-IOI ("void and of no effect as between the parties
to the same and all other persons, except holders in good faith, without notice") ; Matlock v.
Scheuerman, 51 Ore. 49, 52, 93 Pac, 823, 825 (19o8) ; u. REv. STAT, (Cahill, i933) c. 32,
§ 290 ("void at the election of the purchaser"); McGregor v. Lamont, 225 Ill. App. 451
(1922).
7. ARKc. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 7956, which adds "and no person shall
be considered an innocent holder of thp same, though he may have given value . . . before
maturity"; IOWA CODE (931) § 9442; S. D. Comp. LAWS (1929) § 3929; and see Wyatt v.
Wallace, 67 Ark. 575, 576, 55 S. W. 11o5, 1io6 (igoo) ; AiA. CODE (1907) § 3653 ("null and
void") ; CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 3757, § 2 (same) ; Ky. Acts 1891-1893, § 34 (3)
(same) ; N. Y. CONS. LAWs (Cahill, 1930) c. 40, § 993 ("utterly void"); 9 ANN- c. 14, § I
(1710) ("void as to all intents and purposes whatsoever").
8. N. D. REv. CODE (899) § 3265; National Bk. of Commerce v. Pick, 13 N. D. 74, 99
N. W. 63 (i9o4) ; and see FI" Coap. LAws (907) c. 5717 ("void on its behalf and on be-
half of its assigns") ; Commercial Barnk v. Jordan, 71 Fla. 566, 71 So. 76o (I916).
9. CoLO. Comsp. LAws (192I) § 6869 ("void [and] no assignment . . . shall in any
manner offset the defense . . . or the remedies of any person interested therein") ; UTAH
REV. STAT. (1933) tit 18, c. 8, § 5 ('"wholly void on behalf of such corporation and its as-
signees and every person deriving any interest or title therefrom, but shall be valid and en-
forceable against such corporation, assignee and person") ; National Bk, of the Republic v.
Price, 65 Utah 57, 63-65, 234 Pac. 231, 34 (1925) ; see Aiu. DiG. STAT., note 7, supra.
io. See ScHusTER, PaRNcrLFs OF GERMAN LAW (1907) 81 et seq.; I PLsANioL ET RIPERT,
TRArrp, ELuMENTAIRE DE Daorr CVm. (iith ed. x928) Nos. 328, 329, 330, 332; CHUNG Hui
WANs, GERMAN CIVIt CODE (i907) 6po.
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able between the parties (a sort of defense of illegality) ; broadly interpreted,
without any effect, null and void as to the whole world. The problem at the
outset, then, becomes one of statutory interpretation and construction.
The State of the Law Before the N. I. L.
Before the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law, the problem
was usually simple. Since most of the law of negotiable instruments was
still uncodified, the courts had to deal with the effect of a single statute on
the rights of a bona fide purchaser before maturity, as to whom the law had
not yet crystallized into codified form. In these statutes the legislature had
singled out particular transactions to condemn, such as gambling, lending
money at high rates of interest and the like. The purchase of a negotiable
instrument by a subsequent bona fide purchaser was outside of the prohibited
transaction. By a narrow construction of the statute, the court deciding
the suit between the holder in due course and the maker easily could rely on
the equities, pointing out that the maker was really a party to the wrongful
act and that the holder was an innocent party who would suffer loss as a
result of the maker's wrong if he were not allowed to collect on the paper.
Persuaded by these considerations, the court could easily hold that the statute
meant "void as between the parties only".
On the other hand, it might be argued with equal force that the prohib-
itory statutes were designed to protect the maker, that if the bona fide pur-
chaser could recover, this purpose would be defeated; and the wrongdoer, the
professional gambler or usurer, as the case might be, would be enabled to
consummate his illegal acts with the proceeds of the instrument which he
received from the bona fide purchaser. To prevent this result no recovery
should be allowed, and the bona fide purchaser should be remanded to his
rights against his vendor on the indorsement. Such a result might be classed
as a broad interpretation of the statute by applying it to circumstances not
contemplated by the legislature. Considering the fact also that the legislature
had chosen the term "void" instead of "illegal" or "voidable" it is not sur-
prising that the courts adopted the broad interpretation suggested in the lat-
ter line of reasoning to reach the result that the instrument was "utterly void
ab initio" and that no life could be breathed into it by later transactions so as
to hold the original maker. 1  Thus under the Statute of Anne 12 on gambling
and the New York usury laws 13 declaring the instruments void, it was not
surprising to find the courts holding them "entirely void" even in the hands
of bona fide purchasers. 14 In fact this was so well established that illegality
ii. Note L. R. A. i9i8C 773 et seq.; STORY, op. cit. supra note I, at 225; BYLES, op. Cit.
supra note I, at 207.
12. 9 ANNE C. 14, § I (1710).
13. N. Y. CONs. LAws (Cahill, 193o) C. 21, § 373.
14. Bowyer v. Bampton, 2 Strange 1155 (K. B. 1795) ; Shillito v. Theed, 7 Bing. 405
(C. P. 1831) ; Claflin v. Boorum, 122 N. Y. 385, 25 N. E. 360 (i8go).
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of this sort was often classed as a real defense at common law.' 5 But though
the broad interpretation was the more persuasive and represented better stat-
utory construction, it was not entirely unanimous, and there was excellent
authority even under the common law applying the narrow construction of
the penal statute and allowing recovery in favor of the bona fide purchaser
before maturity.' 6
Can a Statute Make a Void Instrument Valid in the Hands of "Subsequent
Purchaser"?
These latter minority decisions have been criticised on the ground that
in the nature of things if an instrument is void it is non-existent and cannot
get life by subsequent transactions in which the maker takes no part.17
Arguments of this sort also may proceed from a kind of biological analogy
that when a thing is once dead it remains dead, or perhaps they rest on a
metaphysical concept that when a thing is void it is nothing, and it is impos-
sible to make something out of nothing.
Such arguments are put to the acid test when one encounters a jurisdic-
tion where one statute makes contracts void because issued for an illegal or
prohibited purpose and another statute makes negotiable instruments valid
against all defenses in the hands of a subsequent bona fide purchaser.
The logician, metaphysician or those adopting the biological analogy
are hard pressed by a statutory situation such as existed in South Dakota
both prior to IS and after 1 the adoption of the N. I. L. The South Dakota
Code of 1919 referring to gaming provided:
"Any note, bond or other contract made and entered into, where
the whole or any part of the consideration thereof shall be for money
or other valuable thing, won or lost, laid, staked or betted at or upon
any game of any kind, under any name or by any means; or for the
repayment of money or other thing of value, lent or advanced, at the
time and for the purpose of any game, play, bet or wager, or being laid,
staked, betted or wagered thereon shall be absolutely void." 20
15. See BRANNAN, NEGoTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 440 et seq.; Danforth,
Illegality Under the Negotiable Instrunents Law (192I) 92 CENT. L. J. 27; 2 WIUMISTON,
CoNTRACrS (1920) § 1158; Green, Real Defenses and the Negotiable Instruments Law (1934)
9 TULANE L. Ray. 78.
16. Ewell v. Daggs, 1o8 U. S. 143 (1883) ; see Sondheim v. Gilbert, 117 Ind. 71, 80, 18
N. E. 687, 691 (1888).
x7. Danforth, supra note 15, at 33, 37. The author of this article goes even further and
argues that the maker cannot even estop himself by subsequent representations. But the
writer himself admits that this is contrary to the cases which he cites and to the weight of
authority. Holzbog v. Bakrow, i56 Ky. 161, i6o S. W. 792 (1913), 50 L. R. A. (x. s.) 1023
(1914). This argument is also clearly contrary to the general theory of the N. I. L. See
§§ 23, 124, allowing such estoppel where otherwise the instrument would be void. See also
Green, supra note 15, at 85 et seq.
I8. The gaming law (nfra note 20) was adopted in i9o7.
19. The N. I. L. was adopted in South Dakota in 1913. BRANNAN, op. cit. sztpra note 2,
at 1126.
2.o. S. D. CouP. LAWS (1929) § 3929.
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Another section of the same code dealing with negotiable instruments read
as follows:
"An indorsee of a negotiable instrument, in due course, acquires
an absolute title thereto, so that it is valid in his hands, notwithstanding
any provision of law making it generally void or voidable, and notwith-
standing any defect in the title of the person from whom he ac-
quired it." 21
It might be argued that the two statutes are contradictory and that the last
therefore repeals the former.22 The matter is simple enough when the statutes
have different dates, but unfortunately both were enacted in the same code.
It is a clear canon of statutory construction that in cases of contradiction the
special act takes precedence over the general, 23 but unfortunately the gaming
act is special as to gaming but general as to the contracts effected thereby,
while the N. I. L. is general as to illegality but special as to negotiable instru-
ments. The case at hand is one of a negotiable instrument given for gaming.
Both acts as applied to the facts are special and both general, so that the
rule is useless. Under such circumstances, it might be suggested that since
the two articles are contradictory on this set of facts both fall out of the
code and the court is remitted to the common law. 24  However, it is a clear
canon of statutory construction and common sense that the legislature should
not be made to contradict itself if by any reasonable construction the two
apparently conflicting statutes can be reconciled. 25 In this case such a recon-
ciliation is easy. It is possible to argue that the prohibitory statute protecting
the maker applies to the contract between the parties and their assigns with
notice; but that the purpose of the law on negotiable instruments was to
protect the bona fide purchaser by allowing him to rely on the facts appearing
from the paper which he purchased. Since the maker created these facts he
should be held. Thus each statute is given its primary purpose, and the
apparent difficulty vanishes. This interpretation is hard on the logician and
metaphysician, but since it serves the purposes of justice in real life it is not
surprising that the courts found no difficulty in reaching it.
26
21. S. D. ComiP. LAWS (1929) § 172o. This is § 16 of the N. I. L. especially amended
to cover this situation.
22. This is the usual interpretation of statutes at common law. MAXWELL, INTERPRETA-
TION OF STATUTES (7th ed. 1929) 138 et seq.; DwAmus, TREATISE ON STATUTES (Potter's Am.
ed. 1885) 155 et seq.; Sidon, J. in First Nat. Bk. v. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 294-296, 194 Pac.
661, 665 (192o). The problem may be greatly complicated by the existence of repealing
clauses in the later act. But since this depends upon the particular words of particular acts
and involves a totally different type of interpretation, consideration of repealing clauses is
omitted.
23. See Garnett v. Bradley, 3 App. Cas. 944, 950 (1878).
24. See Gutteridge, A Comparative View of the Interpretation of Statute Law (1933)
8 TULANE L. REv. I, 6, and authorities there cited.
25. MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 136-144; DwAmus, op. cit. supra note 22, at 154,
n. 4.26. McCardell v. Davis, 49 S. D. 554, 207 N. W. 662 (1926) ; and for the same result
under two statutes in Georgia before the N. I. L. creating a similar situation, Howard v.
Simpkins, 70 Ga. 322 (1883).
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The Meaning of Section 57 of the N. I. L.
If the N. I. L. had clearly expressed the intention that all instruments
void at inception should be valid in the hands of a holder in due course it
would not have expressed a concept foreign to Anglo-American law or
difficult of understanding.27 Fortunately, however, the Act is not so rashly
phrased. Section 57, which is the key to the problem, states:
"A holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect
of title of prior parties, and free from deferises available to prior parties
among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the
full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."
Nothing is said about illegality, but it should be noted that a holder in due
course takes free from defects of title, and Section 55, defining defect of
title, provides:
"The title of a person who negotiates an instrument is defective
within the meaning of this act when he obtained the instrument, or any
signature thereto by . ., or other unlawful means, or for an illegal
consideration.. "
On its face, it would seem that, so far-as these two sections are con-
cerned, the Act is susceptible of either of two interpretations: (i) a holder
in due course cuts off only personal defenses; or (2) instruments void for
illegality are good in the hands of a holder in due course.
The use in Section 57 of the phrase "free from defenses available to
prior parties among themselves" might, from an historical point of view, be
taken to be only a codification of the common law, which recognized real
defenses and the defense of statutory voidability; and "unlawful means"
and "illegal consideration" in Section 55 could be taken as a codification of
the law as it stood on the point and no more, "defects of title" being simply
substituted for the comriion law terminology, "personal defenses". It might
be argued also that the holder in due course can hold only "parties. liable
thereon" and that the maker is not liable since the instrument was void. This
line of argument will be recognized at once as a narrow construction of the
statute.
28
On the other hand, it may be argued with equal force that the words
"all parties liable thereon" mean persons who appear to be liable on the face
of the instrument (as the holder in due course sees it). The holder in due
course under this interpretation of Section 57 would take free from defects
27. See Ewell v. Daggs, 1O8 U. S. 143 (1883); and authorities cited notes 20, 21, 26,
supra.
28. This narrow construction is supported by most of the older writers trained in the
recent common law methods of interpretation. See 2 WIlIsON, CoNTRAcrs (ig2o) § 1159;
BRANNAIx, N EOTABLn INsTRuJmTs LAW (Chafee's 4 th ed. 1926) 441; but cf. id. (Beutel's
5th ed. 1932) 556.
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of title as defined in Section 55, and the reference to "defenses available to
prior parties among themselves" would apply to payment, suretyship de-
fenses, and the like.29  Section 55 in defining "defects" uses the very broad
terms, "duress, or force and fear, or other unlawful means, or for an illegal
consideration". Surely when one takes an instrument in a situation pro-
hibited by law he obtains it by "unlawful means" and for an "illegal consid-
eration", and since the statute does not distinguish between various kinds of
illegality, it might be taken to cover them all. This broad interpretation, of
course, would achieve the same result as the South Dakota statute, and would
make the instrument valid in the hands of the holder in due course.
The history of the Act offers little to clear up this ambiguity except that
the argument for the broad interpretation may be strengthened slightly by
the fact that the draftsman in copying the Bills of Exchange Act, Section
38 (2), omitted the words "mere personal" when speaking of cutting off
"defenses available to prior parties among themselves". 30 Prima facie, this
omission would tend to show intention of the N. I. L. to cut off other than
personal defenses. Unfortunately the draftsman's notes explaining the
changes from the British Act, and the proceedings of the Saratoga meeting
at which the N. I. L. was discussed and approved are not available.31
The Ames-Brewster controversy and contemporary writings explaining
the Act throw little light on the intention of the framers on this point.
32
Judge Brewster 33 speaks approvingly of Wirt v. Stubblefield,34 discussed
below, which is a square adoption of the previous minority rule.35 Crawford,
29. See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 119 (4), 120, 122; Brewster, A Defense of
the Negotiable Instruments Law (igoo) io YALE L. J. 84, 94, reprintedIn BRANNAN, NEGO-
TIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (2d ed. 191i) 179, i89; Eaton, The Negotiablg Instruments Law
(19o4) 2 MICH. L. REv. 260, 276 et seq., citing with approval Farrell, The Negotiable Instru-
inents Law (igoo) 3 THE BRIEF OF PHI DELTA PHL See also Beutel, The Meaning of the
Term "Principal Debtor" as used in. the N. I. L. (April, 1934) PA. BAR Q. 2o6.
3o. See CHALMERS, BIu.S OF EXCHANGE (gth ed. 1927) 146; cf. BRANNAN, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 619, 559, and authorities there cited.
31. These notes are mentioned by McKeehan, The Negotiable Instruments Law (A Re-
view of the Ames-Brewster Controversy) (1902) 50 U. OF PA. L. REv. 437, 439, and are re-
produced in part at least, if not in full, in HuFFCUT, NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS (Ist ed.
1898) 5-81; but this report throws no light on the problem involved here. Since this article
went to press, the writer has discovered a manuscript copy of Crawford's notes in the Har-
vard Law Library; but he has as yet been unable positively to identify it as the official draft.
These contemporary discussions are of the greatest value in determining legislative intent.
32. The Ames-Brewster controversy in the HARVARD LAW REVIEW and the YALE LAW
JOURNAL have been reprinted in full in the first three editions of BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE IN-
STRUMENTS LAW. To these should be added, as of even greater value for source material,
Eaton's two articles on the N. I. L.: (1904) 2 MICH. L. REV. 26o; (913) 12 id. 89; Farrell,
supra note 29; CRAWFoRD, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (Ist ed. 1897). None of these,
however, can equal in value the actual debate of the Commission. The writer would greatly
appreciate any suggestion as to the location of these materials.
33. Reply to supplementary note, BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (2d ed.
1gii) 217, 218.
34. 17 App. D. C. 283 (1900).
35. It is interesting to note in this respect that Judge Brewster .reported in Uniform
State Laws (1898) 21 A. B. A. REP. 315, 322, that wherever there was a split of authority on
a point the Commission attempted to adopt the rule of the Supreme Court. But there is no
evidence, other than inference from this statement, to show whether or not §§ 55 and 57 of
the N. I. L. were intended to adopt the rule of Ewell v. Daggs, io8 U. S. 143 (1883), cited
note 16, supra.
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the draftsman, in the first edition of his work, does not mention the problem,
but in a later edition 36 expresses the opinion that the solution of the question
should be left to the public policy of the states. These ex post facto state-
ments are at the best only slight indications of the true intent of the framers,
and are far from conclusive.
An examination of other sections of the N. I. L. will show that the
concept of the broad interpretation, that an instrument entirely without effect
or even inception may be valid in the hands of a holder in due course, is not
foreign to the Act. Section i6 provides that an instrument although "incom-
plete and revocable" for lack of delivery is enforceable in the hands of a
holder in due course, thus abolishing the common law real defense of absence
of delivery. 7  Section i4 provides that an instrument issued with blanks
"in order that it may be enforced" must be "filled up strictly in accordance
with authority given"; but nevertheless it is enforceable for any amount in
the hands of a holder in due course. Sections 119 to 122 make it possible
for a holder in due course to collect on a discharged instrument, thereby
abolishing another common law real defense.38 It might be objected that
these sections are not good analogies because the Act does not use the term
void; but Section 1243' provides that while in case of alteration the instru-
ment is "avoided", nevertheless in the hands of a holder in due course it
springs to life and is again enforceable, another departure from the common
law.
40
These sections then show the intention expressed in the Act that a holder
in due course may rely upon the instrument as it appears on its face, if that
appearance was in fact caused by the party defendant, even though such
defendant was not legally liable on the instrument before it came to the
holder. If this principle should be applied to the facts under consideration,
36. CRAWFoRD, NE rLAiLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (3d ed. 1908) 71 et seq.
37. I DAIMEL, NEonrmA INSTRUMENTS (7th ed. 1933) § 69; BRANNAN, NEGoTLrALE
INSTRUMENTS LAW (4th ed. 1926) 432.
38. Ibid. That discharge is now a personal defense seems clear. Brewster, A Defense
of the Negotiable Instruments Law (igoo) io YALE L. J. 84; Eaton, The N. I. L., Its History
and Its Practical Operation, (19o4) 2 MicH. L. REV. 261, 276, 277; BRANNAN, Op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 558; cf. NraorAmm INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 57, 121, 122. The only argument to the
contrary to be drawn from the Act springs from Section 47: "An instrument negotiable in
its origin continues to be negotiable until it has been restrictively indorsed or discharged by
paynent or otherwise" (italics are the writer's). From this section it may be argued that
after discharge the instrument is non-negotiable, so that discharge becomes a real defense and
a subsequent holding in due course is made impossible. It should be noted that the Section
provides only for continued negotiability before these facts, i. e., restrictive indorsement or
discharge, non constat that the condition would be different afterwards, especially when other
sections of the act demand a different interpretation. See especially Section 122. Discharge
was held a personal defense in Manchester v. Parsons, 75 W. Va. 793, 84 S. E. 885 (1915).
See comment on Trietel v. Gibson, 131 Misc. 377, 226 N. Y. Supp. 6o3 (Sup. Ct. 1928), in
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 911.
39. "But when an instrument has been materially altered and is in the hands of a holder
in due course, not a party to the alteration, he may enforce payment thereof according to its
original tenor."
40. Voris v. Birdsall, 62 Okla. 286, 162 Pac. 951 (1917) ; Hecht v. Shenners, 126 Wis.
o, l5 N. W. 309 (905).
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it would seem that the broad interpretation not only is not opposed to the
law of negotiable instruments as codified by the Act, but also seems to fit
better than the narrower construction which assumes, contrary to fact, that
the Act codified the common law without change.
41
It should be noted, however, that this broad interpretation is not abso-
lutely required by the Act. The analogies, though persuasive, are neither
compelling nor conclusive. Both interpretations are still possible. Which
one should be adopted has wisely been left to the courts to be determined
upon other considerations or "equities", such as the intent of the parties, the
hardships resulting from the given situation, and the public policy as indi-
cated by the legislature in its acts on illegality, which also, as has been shown,
may be subject to more than one interpretation.
In its final analysis, the question then becomes a problem of judicial
evaluation of legislative policies projected against the background of the
facts of particular cases. The framers of the N I. L. easily might have
achieved certainty by providing that instruments void for illegality should
nevertheless be valid in the hands of a holder in due course. But it is sub-
mitted that problems arising out of situations involving illegality are neces-
sarily so complex and touch so many interests that here is a proper place for
the judicial administration of flexible standards rather than for an applica-
tion of inflexible rules of law. Most of the irreconcilable confusion in the
cases in this field has been due to the courts' search for simple rules of law
and to the failure to appreciate their duty to administrate legislative stand-
ards. An examination of the legislative policy behind the statutes and their
effect upon the courts will serve to illustrate this point.
The Condition of Source Materials for Determining Legislative Policy
In determining the true meaning of legislation and the policy behind it
many factors are involved. In addition to the text of the statute and its title
and preamble, there are the legislative history of the bill, the debates on the
floor of the legislature, the committee hearings, the amendments offered and
rejected and adopted, the executives' messages accompanying the submission
of a legislative program or a veto, the purpose of the organization which
drafted the particular bill or lobbied for it; all may have a pertinent bearing
41. The assumption that the N. I. L. codified the common law embodies two fallacies, one
of fact and another of legal application. As a matter of fact, it is common knowledge that the
N. I. L. made many changes, too numerous to list here, in the usually accepted common law
rules. Many of Dean Ames' objections were founded on this ground. In addition see C.A-
'ORD, NEGOABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW (ist ed. 1897) iii; McKeehan, The Negotiable Instru-
ments Law (192o) 50 U. OF PA. L. REv. 437, 440. As a problem of practical legal applica-
tion, there was no common law to codify; only the common law of over fifty jurisdictions
which differed in the holdings of their courts so radically that codification was forced upon
an unwilling profession as a matter of commercial necessity. Whenever a court indulges in
the argument that the N. I. L. is the codification of the common law, it is simply rationalizing
a return to its own decisions in its particular jurisdiction. Much of the confusion in the cases
since the N. I. L. is due to this wholly unwarranted and fallacious method of statutory con-
struction. See Beutel, The Necessity of a New Technique of Interpreting the N. I. L. (Ig3i)
6 TULANE L. REv. I, 6.
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on the true meaning of the statute and the policy which it attempts to effec-
tuate. In the case of a uniform law the proceedings of the commission and
the draftsman's notes also offer invaluable source material.
42
Unfortunately, legislative material in the United States is so inacces-
sible, so carelessly assembled and so poorly indexed that a busy practicing
lawyer considers himself lucky if he can find the text of the current statute.
With the possible exception of acts of Congress, legislative history in most
cases seems to be beyond the reach of even the most careful legal scholar.
It is small wonder then that the courts have floundered in the maze of legis-
lative variation, often turning for convenience, but nevertheless erroneously
and irrelevantly, to the concepts of the common law or to previous decisions
to discover the meaning of acts of the legislature,
Although the art of legislative interpretation in this country is greatly
handicapped by the absence of an American Digest System for legislation,
the situation is not so hopeless as the results of the cases might indicate.
Proper attention to relevant factors of the problem can go a long way
towards relieving the difficulty.
Statutes for the Protection of Public Order
Statutes declaring instruments void fall generally into two classes: (i)
those passed to protect the public order, and (2) statutes designed primarily
to protect individuals or classes of people from greed, trickery, or business
advantages held by others.
A. Gaming Statutes
The oldest and most numerous statutes directed toward the protection
of public order are those declaring void contracts made in gambling, and,
strange to say, it is in this field that the court decisions have proved the most
unsatisfactory.
Viewed from the point of view of statutory policy and the equities
involved, it would seem that a holder in due course should be allowed to
recover unless the statute expressly declared the instrument to be void in his
hands. The purpose of the gambling statute is, of course, to discourage
gambling, and in attempting to do so it declares the instrument given for
money won at play void. The purpose of the N. I. L. is to protect the inno-
cent purchaser. The reconciliation of policies seems simple, the statute on
42. It is unfortunate that there is no record of the committee hearings, and that the delib-
erations of the Uniform Laws Commission, when discussing a law, are carried on in the com-
mittee of the whole and are unpublished. The draftsman's notes published with the later copies
of the uniform laws tend, to some extent, to alleviate this difficulty, but there is nothing which
even approaches the discussions of the French Civil Code. See FE,rET, RECEUIL COMPLET DE
TRAVAUX PREPARATIONES DU CODE CIvIL (1827) in fifteen volumes; FENET, MoTrFs r Dis-
COURs DU CODE CrviL (1850) in two volumes; Locat, LA LPGrSLATION DE LA FRANCE (1827)
in thirty-one volumes. Unfortunately, Americans labor under the fallacious belief that when
a law is reduced to writing it is clear. Apparently, all the similar valuable material for the
American Law Institute's Restatennts is also being displaced by a lot of local annotations,
which will immediately start to defeat the unifying effect of the Restatcments.
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gaming should be held to apply to the gamblers and their assignees; but the
holder in due course should recover. In this way the gambler is made to
bear the loss and not the innocent holder. 43 Thus the purpose of the gaming
statute to discourage gambling is also achieved. It seems equally clear that,
on the equities, the innocent holder should be protected against the wrong-
doing maker who has caused the situation by violating the statute. This was
the result achieved by a few of the early and well reasoned decisions under
the N. I. L.,44 but unfortunately the overwhelming weight of authority in
the United States is to the contrary.
48
The leading case which the majority decisions seem to follow is Alex-
ander & Co. v. Hazelrigg,46 involving the interpretation of a Kentucky
statute which provided as follows:
"Every contract, conveyance . . . for consideration . . . of
money . . . won, lost or bet in any game, sport, pastime, wager, or
for consideration of money, property, or other thing lent for the pur-
pose of gaming . . . shall be void." 47
The court, relying upon previous decisions of the state properly holding
that the statute before the N. I. L. made the instruments void in the hands
of bona fide purchasers, stated that the public policy was well established to
this effect. This argument entirely overlooked the fact that the old decisions
were no longer the law of the state but were superseded by the codification
of the law of negotiable instruments in the new Act.48  It also disregarded
the fact that the enactment of the N. I. L. is itself an expression of public
policy which, coming from the legislature, is more effective than that based
upon judicial decisions interpreting previous legislation.
This case and those that follow it also lean very heavily on the doctrine
of implied repeal. It is a well established rule that statutes are not repealed
by later ones unless they are expressly named in the repealing clause or unless
43. The contrary argunents that if the holder in due course is allowed to recover the
winner is more easily enabled to achieve the fruits of his victory, or that if the holder in due
course cannot recover gambling with notes vill be discouraged is of no force, because by
hypothesis the holder in due course knows nothing of the defense of gambling-otherwise he
would not be a holder in due course. On the other hand, if the gambler knows that the courts
will not enforce his notes he may be encouraged to use them at play, knowing that if he loses
he will not have to pay. The right of recourse by the holder in due course against the winner
on his endorsement is of little importance, because the maker usually has a similar right under
gambling laws, and neither holder nor maker is likely to have much success in finding him.
44. Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C. 283 (19oo) ; Myers v. Kessler, 142 Fed. 730 (C.
C. A. 3d, 19o6) ; Wolford v. Martinez, 28 N. M. 622, 216 Pac. 499 (1923) ; cf. Citizens' Nat.
Bk. v. McDannald, 116 Va. 834, 83 S. E. 389 (1914).
45. The cases are collected in a series of notes. (1920) 8 A. L. R. 314; (1921) II A. L.
R. 211; (1925) 37 A. L. R. 698; (1927) 46 A. L. R. 959.
46. 123 Ky. 677, 97 S. W. 353 (19o6).
47. The statute is now Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930) § 1955.
48. See the excellent discussion to this effect in Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C. 283
(19oo), quoted and then ignored by the court. 123 Ky. at 682, 683, 97 S. W. at 354. See also
Eaton, On Uniformity in Judicial Decisions of Cases Arising Under the N. I. L. (1913) 12
MIcH. L. REV. 89, 91.
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they are contradicted by the later statutes. Repeals by implication should
be avoided. 49 On this ground the courts in the majority cases maintain the
previous judicial rule and either ignore the N. I. L. or give it the narrow
construction."0 Their argument is subject to two fallacies. It assumes that
the judicial interpretation of the gaming law is part of the older statute,
which is not the case, and secondly, it assumes that to change their judicial
interpretation is to repeal the gaming statute. There is really no question of
repeal involved. The gaming statute still is in force, and it is too clear for
argument that no matter what may be the result as to a holder in due course,
it still applies as between the parties and to purchasers with notice. The only
question involved is the effect of both statutes on the particular problem of
the rights of the holder in due course. As has been shown, this is merely a
question of adopting an interpretation which, by reconciling both enactments,
best fits the purpose of the two statutes and the ends of justice.
Many of the majority. cases rely upon the old aphorism that when a
thing is "void" it is non-existent and can have no life; 51 but even the Ken-
tucky court admits the doctrine of estoppel to make a void instrument valid 52
even though the estopping facts are contained only in the void instrument
itself.5 3 But this doctrine of voidness is put to the acid test when the question
of indorsement for a gaming debt under identical statutes is involved. Here
the weight of authority swings the other way,54 and the indorsement is held
good in the hands of a holder in due course. It is submitted that the consid-
erations in both cases are identical, so far as the validity of the indorsement
to pass title under a statute reading as follows:
"All things in action, judgments, mortgages, conveyances and every
other security whatsoever, given or executed . . . for any money or
other thing won by playing at any game whatsoever . . . shall be
utterly void." "
Yet the cases have held that indorsements for gaming debts pass title under
these acts to holders in due course,"6 even though such a holder could not
49. DwARaus, op. cit. supra note 22, at 154, n. 4; MAXWELL, op. cit. supra note 22, at 136
et seq.
so. See Alexander v. Hazelrigg, 123 Ky. 677, 97 S. W. 353 (igo6), cited note 46, supra;
Manufacturers & Merchants Bk. v. Twelfth Street Bk., 223 Mo. App. 191, 16 S. W. (2d)
105 (1929) ; Plank v. Swift, 187 Iowa 293, 174 N. W. 236 (i919) ; Fisher v. Brehm, Ioo N.
J. L. 345, 346, 126 Atil. 444, 445 (I924) ; and cases cited in Note (192o) 8 A. L. R. 315. For
cases ignoring the N. I. L. entirely, 8 id. at 317.
51. For a good example of this argument carried to the extreme see Manufacturers &
Merchants Bk. v. Twelfth Street Bk., 223 Mo. App. 191, 16 S. W. (2d) 104 (1929).
52. Holzbog v. Bakrow, 156 Ky. i6I, i6o S. W. 792 (1913), 5o L. R. A. (N. s.) 1023
(1914).
53. Billington v. McColpin, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1281, 6o S. W. 923 (1900) ; Moseley v. Selma
Nat. Bk., 3 Ala. App. 614, 57 So. 91 (911).
54. 3 WrLUlSTON, CONTRACTS (1920) § 1677.
55. N. Y. Coxs. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 41, § 993; see also ARK. DIG. STAT. (Crawford
& Moses, 1921) § 49o2. The italics are the writer's.
56. Rumping v. Arkansas Nat. Bk. of Hot Springs, 121 Ark. 202, 18o S. W. 749 (1915);
Bernstein v. Fuerth, 132 Misc. 343, 229 N. Y. Supp. 791 (Manhattan Mun. Ct. 1928) ; cf.
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recover from a gambling maker.57  This shows clearly the weakness of the
majority cases where the statute merely states that the instrument is void
for gaming.
, The one remaining argument in support of the majority cases on gaming
statutes is that since the N. I. L. was passed to achieve uniformity, 8 and
since the majority of cases have held that a statute declaring an instrument
void is effective against a holder in due course, all courts should now reach
this conclusion even though it involves overruling previous cases." Al-
though this rule is usually sound, it is clear that it must apply only to the
weight of authority of cases decided after and citing the N. I. L. To hold
otherwise might result simply in carrying forward common law rules that
were entirely contrary to the principal purpose, or even the express wording,
of the Act. 0° If the courts in Alexander v. Hazelrigg and those cases which
blindly followed it as the weight of authority to the effect that void meant
wholly null and void as to all persons 61 had properly followed the uniformity
rule, they would have reached the opposite result, because as late as 1911,
five years after the decision of this leading case, the weight of authority of
cases under and citing the N. I. L. was clearly to the effect that voidness by
statute had ceased to be a real defense under the N. I. L.
62
If then the courts had properly interpreted the acts involved, a statute
merely declaring an instrument void because of gaming would have no effect
against a holder in due course, and it is submitted that the cases should still
reach this result.
But where the gambling statute goes further and provides, in addition
to the phrases quoted above, that:
"No assignment of any bill, bond, note . . . where the whole or
any part of the consideration for such assignmeit shall arise out of any
gaming transaction, shall in any manner offset the defense of the person
or persons making or giving suchinstrument . . or the remedies of
any person interested therein," 63"
Kushner v. Abbott, 156 Iowa 598, 137 N. W. 913 (I912) ; Sakon v. Santini, 257 Mich. 9I, 241
N. W. i6o (1932). Contra: Manufacturers & Merchants Bk. v. Twelfth St. Bk., 223 Mo.
App. I9I, 16 S. W. (2d) io4 (x929).
57. Larschen v. Lantzes, 115 Misc. 616, 189 N. Y. Supp. 137 (ist Dep't I92i).
58. See authorities collected in BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 83 et seq.
59. Farmers State Bk. v. Clayton Nat. Bk., 31 N. M. 344, 245 Pac. 543, 46 A. L. R. 952
(1925), overruling Wolford v. Martinez, 28 N. M. 622, 216 Pac. 499 (1923), cited note 44,
supra; see also Green, Real Defenses and the Negotiable Instruments Law (1934) 9 TULANE
L. REv. 78, 85.6o. An example of this sort is found in the cases holding that bank credit is not value
under the N. I. L., a result clearly contrary to the express wording of § 25. See also Beutel,
supra note 42, at 14.
61. See supra note 59; (1921) 70 U. oF PA. L. REv. 52.
62. See cases collected in BRANNAN, NEGoTiABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (2d ed. 1911) 6o;
Twentieth St. Bk. v. Jacobs, 74 W. Va. 525, 82 S. E. 320, 321 (1914).
63. CoLo. Comip. LAws (1921) § 6869. Italics are the writer's.
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the courts properly hold that both the making 64 and the indorsement 65 are
invalid in the hands of a holder in due course. In this case it is clear that the
legislature contemplated the transfer to remote parties. Even though one
may quarrel with a legislative policy which penalizes innocent holders for the
benefit of wrongdoers, the reconciliation of the two acts demands that the
courts apply the narrow construction to the N. I. L.
B. Foreign Corporations and Blue Sky Laws
Another and more recent group of statutes designed to protect public
order includes those governing the activities of foreign corporations within
the state and the so-called "blue sky" laws regulating the floating of corpo-
rate financing. The general consideration of policy behind these statutes is
similar to that governing the gaming statutes. Although they involve to
some extent protection of the local citizen dealing with the corporations,
their chief concern usually is directed toward controlling corporate activity,
safeguarding the state treasury's revenue arising from incorporation fees,
and assuring local citizens the right to sue the foreign business unit by pro-
hibiting it from doing business until they have complied with the state laws.
Such being the case, one would expect to find that the innocent holder in due
course would be protected against the maker or drawer who created the
situation, even though innocently, by entering into the forbidden transaction.
It is interesting to note that most of the statutes of this sort were passed
after the N. I. L., and the great majority of the courts, being unhampered by
previous common law decisions, have found no difficulty in reaching a proper
result, and one contrary in effect to the majority of cases under the gaming
statutes.
Where the act provides that "Every sale or contract of sale made or
executed in violation of any provision of this act shall be void","0 or employs
words of similar import, 7 with one possible exception 's the courts have no
difficulty in allowing recovery by a holder in due course.0 9
64. Ayer v. Younker, io Colo. App. 27, 50 Pac. 218 (1897).
65. Western Nat. Bk. v. State Bk., x8 Colo. App. 128, 70 Pac. 439 (1902).
66. Ind. Laws 1921, c. 102, § 14.
67. ". . . shall be void at the election of the purchaser." IL.. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933)
C. 32, § 290.
68. The courts of Alabama have floundered badly. The court of appeals first held flatly
that the holder in due course could recover under the statute declaring such contracts "null
and void". Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Bucherit, 14 Ala. App. 511, 71 So. 82 (1916). The supreme
court refused a writ of certiorari. 196 Ala. 700, 72 So. 1019 (r916). Six months later the
same court of appeals, apparently unconscious of the action of the supreme court, reached an
opposite result. Jones v. Martin, 15 Ala. App. 675, 74 So. 761 (1917). Still later the supreme
court in Paul v. Patterson Cigar Co., 21o Ala. 532, 534, 98 So. 787, 788 (924), indulged in
some dicta to the effect that a holder in due course could not recover. Hogan v. Intertype Cor-
poration, 136 Ark. 52, 2o6 S. W. 58 (i918) is sometimes cited for the contrary proposition; but
that case did not involve a negotiable instrument, and also was decided under a statute merely
prohibiting such transactions and not "in terms making them void. See ARic. Dia. STAT.
(Crawford and Moses, ip2r) § 1832. In such cases the courts are unanimous that a holder
n due course may recover. See Note (1921) 12 A. L. i 1379; Ockenfels v. Boyd, 297 Fed.
614 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924), refusing to follow the Arkansas case.
69. Rainier v. La Rue, 83 Ind. App. 28, 147 N. E. 312 (925) ; McGregor v. Lamont, 225
Ill. App. 451 (r922).
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Even where the Act provides as follows:
"Every contract made by or on behalf of any foreign corporation
affecting its liability or relating to property within the state before it
shall have complied with the provisions of this act shall be void on its
behalf and on behalf of its assigns, but shall be enforceable against it or
them," 70
the courts have given the corporation law a narrow interpretation that
"assigns" does not include holders in due course, who may still recover from
the maker of the instrument under the N. I. L.7'
But where the statute provides:
9* . . every contract, agreement, and transaction whatsoever made
or entered into by or on behalf of any such corporation within this
state, or to be executed or performed within this state, shall be wholly
void on behalf of such corporation and its assignees and every person
deriving any interest or title therefrom, but shall be valid and enforce-
able against such corporation, assignee, and person," 72
it might be argued that "assigns" should be interpreted as before and that a
holder in due course gets his title de novo by his purchase of a negotiable
instrument and does not get "any interest or title" from the corporation.
Nevertheless, a fair interpretation of the statute would certainly lead to the
conclusion that the legislature intended that the holder in due course should
not recover from anybody prior to the wrong-doing corporation. In such a
case one might again question a legislative policy penalizing an innocent
holder, but the courts should enforce the clearly expressed intent of the "blue
sky" law by applying the narrow construction of the N. I. L. refusing recov-
ery against the maker, and they have so held.7 3
C. Miscellaneous Illegality Cases
There is a large number of cases in which the courts talk about a statute
as making the instrument void for illegality, when careful examination will
show that the statute merely prohibits or attaches a penalty. Examples of
these cases are those involving instruments created in violation of Sunday
laws, and the "patent rights", "peddlers' notes" and "lightning rod" cases,
where statutes require that the nature of the consideration be stated, and that
when it is so stated the note shall be non-negotiable, creating a sort of notice
70. Fla. Laws 1907, c. 5717, § 4. The italics are the writer's. For a much similar pro-
vision, see N. D. REV. CODE (1899) § 3265.
71. Commercial Bk. v. Jordan, 71 Fla. 566, 71 So. 76o (1916) ; National Bk. of Com-
merce v. Pick, 13 N. D. 74, 99 N. W. 63 (1916), both cited note 8, supra.
72. UTAH REV. STAT. (933) tit. I8, c. 8, § 5. The italics are the writer's.
73. First Nat. Bank v. Parker, 57 Utah 290, 194 Pac. 66i (1920). This case is weakened
somewhat by National Bk. of Republic v. Price, 65 Utah 57, 234 Pac. 231 (1925), cited note 9,
supra, holding that an alleged holder in due course in such a case had the burden of proving
it and reversing the lower court for directing a verdict for the defendant. See also comment
on this case, BRAxNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 685, and authorities there cited.
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to the holder.74 In the cases involving such statutes it has uniformly and
properly been held that a purchaser in due course can recover from a non-
complying maker.
7 5
Even where the Sunday law expressly provides that "all contracts made
on Sunday" (with certain exceptions not here important) "are void",7 6 the
not too strong public policy behind the act is easily overridden by the broad
interpretation of the N. I. L. when the instrument is in the hands of a holder
in due course. 77  If however the statute provides, for example, that stipula-
tions for attorneys' fees or costs shall be void, it is not surprising to find that
a holder in due course recovers the amount of the note less the void fee.73
These cases can be justified not from any magic in the word void, but on the
ground that illegal facts constituting the basis for the penalty appear on the
face of the note, and that therefore the holder is necessarily charged with
notice of the illegality.
Rural legislatures, in their desire to collect taxes or to protect the "rube"
from the city "slicker", have sometimes gone further. For example, the
Kentucky legislature has provided that "peddlers' notes" shall be so marked
and that:
"To such notes all defenses may be made as against the original holder,
whether the same be placed upon the footing of a bill of exchange or
not; and all contracts for articles or rights made with a peddler without
license, and all notes given for such articles or rights not having the
endorsement across the face, as hereinbefore provided for, shall be null
and void." 7'
Here it seems that the legislature had the problem of subsequent holders in
mind, and at first the courts had little difficulty applying the rule to holders
in due course.80 Lately, however, apparently realizing the unwarranted
hardship on innocent purchasers of such holdings, they are beginning to
protect the holder in due course by preserving the broad meaning of the terms
74. For example see Vis. Laws 1903, c. 438.
75. Sunday laws: Knox v. Clifford, 38 Wis. 65I (1875) ; Gordon v. Levine, 197 Mass.
263, 83 N. E. 86I (i9o8). Statement of nature of consideration: Samson v. Ward, 147 Wis.
48, 132 N. V. 629 (I9iI); Arnd v. Sjoblom, 131 Wis. 642, 1i1 N. W. 666, io L. R. A. (X.
Q.) 84 (x9o7) and note.
76. ALA. CODE (1928) § 6821.
77. Moseley v. Selma Nat. Bk., 3 Ala. App. 614, 57 So. 91 (iii).
78. Leach v. Urschel, 112 Kan. 629, 212 Pac. 1I1 (1923) ; Raleigh County Bk. v. Poteet,
74 AV. Va. Sir, 82 S. E. 332, L. R. A. x9i5B 928 (914) and note.
79. KY. STAT. (Carroll, 193o) § 4223.
8o. Before the N. I. L. such notes were, of course, held void in the hands of a holder in
due course. Burns v. Sparks, 26 Ky. 688, 82 S. WV. 425 (i9o4). After the N. I. L. two cases
were decided not involving holders in due course, in which the court treated the notes as still
entirely void and cited the preceding cases. Lawson v. First Nat. Bank, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 318,
10:2 S. XV. 324 (I907) ; McAfee v. Mercer Nat. Bk., 31 Ky. 863, IO4 S. W. 287 (19o7) ; see
Citizens' Bk. v. Crittenden Record-Press, ISO Ky. 634, I5O S. W. 814 (1912).
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"null and void", but giving an unnecessarily narrow construction to the rest
of the "peddlers' notes" statute.8 '
The legislative passion for punishing innocent holders has been made
even clearer in Arkansas, where the statute specifically includes negotiable
instruments, prescribing their form and further providing:
"No person shall be considered an innocent holder of the same .
and the maker may make such defenses to the collection of the same
in the hands of any holder, and all such notes not showing on their
face for what they were given, shall be absolutely void." 82
This is a clear example of the special statute superseding the general, and in
such a situation the court has no choice other than to enforce the legislative
intent.83
As in the gaming cases, the courts in other fields where illegality and
religious passion are combined occasionally have indulged in the sport of
punishing the innocent holder. For example, a statute making void instru-
ments given for the sale of intoxicating liquor in prohibition territory s' has
been held to supply a good defense against a holder in due course even under
the N. I. L. ;85 an excellent way to encourage illegal purchases of liquor.
One wonders whether a court could be found today which would duplicate
such a holding.
Statutes Protecting Individuals or Classes
Statutes directed toward the protection of individuals or classes of indi-
viduals fall into two groups, those which prohibit certain transactions, mak-
ing their results void, and those which protect the individual contracting
party by depriving him of legal capacity.
A. Usury
The principal type of statute directed toward the protection of individ-
uals or a class of people which does not directly affect their personal capacity
to contract is the usury law. Here the legislature is attempting to prevent
the creditor class from exploiting its economic advantages over poor debtors.
Accordingly, when a statute declares the instrument or part of it void, there
is an expression of legislative intent in the usury law to protect the maker
from exploitation, while in the N. I. L. there is an expression of intent to
protect the holder in due course. The equities are also equal, the loss of
81. Citizens' Bk. v. Crittenden Record-Press, 15o Ky. 634, 150 S. W. 814 (1912) ; Melton
Electric Co. v. Central Credit Corp., 234 Ky. 469, 28 S. W. (2d) 507 (1930). In the last
case the court said that a license was not required; but the case seems to be directly within
the words of the statute.
82. Arkansas Sand & H. Dig., § 493 (1894).
83. Wyatt v. Wallace, 67 Ark. 575, 55 S. W. 1105 (19oo) ; Williams v. Layes, 68 Ark.
675, 271 S. W. II (1925).
84. Miss. AN. CODE § 2085 (Hemingway, 1927).
85. Elkin Henson Grain Co. v. White, 134 Miss. 203, 98 So. 531 (1924).
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either party by judgment for the other is the same, and although the maker,
as in the gambling situations, has created the situation by taking part in an
illegal transaction, it is illegal only because of the legislative desire to protect
him in a situation where he is unable adequately to protect himself. Under
conditions of this sort one would expect to find a larger proportion of the
cases refusing recovery to the holder in due course than in the first class of
cases where voidability is used only to protect public order. Fortunately,
however, this is not the case,"' owing largely to the fact that the courts in this
field have properly paid more attention to the very delicate degrees of varia-
tions in legislative intent.
Lsury laws declaring instruments void fall readily into two classes, those
declaring the whole transaction void,s 7 and those avoiding either a whole SS
or part s of the interest but leaving the contract valid as to the principal sum.
In the latter type the mildness of the penalty shows that the legislature desires
to protect the borrower but not to penalize the capitalists. Where the statute
provides that contracts for illegal interest are:
"null and void as to any agreement or stipulation . . . to pay interest
and no action at law to recover interest in any sum shall be main-
tained" 90
it is not surprising to find a court allowing the holder to recover the entire
amount of the instrument, interest and all, on the ground that since the con-
tract contained therein is partly good, the illegality is a mere defect cut off
by the holder in due course. 9 - But in another state, where the usury statute
uses almost identical words,9 2 the court properly refused recovery to a holder
in due course upon a showing of a long series of legislative amendments
attempting to prevent a narrow interpretation of the usury laws and liberal
interpretations of the N. 1. L. for the benefit of holders in due course.
3
86. See the collection of cases both before and since the N. I. L. in Notes L. R. A. I918C
773; (192o) 5 A. L. R. 1447.
87. E. g., N. Y. Co-,s. LAWS (Cahill, 193o) c. 21, §373; GA. CODE (Michie, 1926)
§§ 1770 (73), 1770 (77).
88. See ALA. CODE (1923) § 8567; 2 CAL. GEz. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 3757, § 2.
89. W. VA. CODE (1931) c. 47, art. 6, § 6.
90. 2 CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 3757, § 2.
9I. Baker v. Butcher, io6 Cal. App. 358, 289 Pac. 236 (193o) ; see also Community Lum-
ber Co. v. Chute, 284 Pac. 466, 469 (Cal. App. 193o), aff d 292 Pac. lO69 (Cal. 1930). Contra
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(1916).
92. "Nor shall the borrower of money at a usurious rate of interest ever in any case in
law or equity be required to pay more than the principal sum borrowed." ALA. CODE (1923)
§ 8567.
93. McCormick v. Fallier, 223 Ala. 80, 134 So. 471 (I931) ; Flagg v. Florence Discount
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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
In New York, where the statute declared the entire usurious instrument
to be void, 94 and whose courts had held before the N. I. L. that the holder
in due course could not recover from the maker,9" an interesting problem
arose. After the adoption of the N. I. L., a bank sued as holder in due course
of a negotiable instrument issued originally in a usurious transaction. A
divided Court of Appeals held that the bank could recover the full amount
of the instrument. 96 Three of the judges 97 placed the decision on the ground
that the state and national banking laws 9s exempted banks from the effects
of the state usury laws. Two judges 99 concurred on the ground that the
N. I. L. broadly interpreted cut off the defense of usury in the hands of a
holder in due course, while the three dissenters o0 thought that the state
usury law as interpreted by previous decisions controlled.
Careful examination will show that both the national banking laws and
the state laws cover only the original taking of usury by the banks, and also
provide for "a forfeiture of the entire interest." 101 Neither statute provides
for the rights of the bank as a purchaser of an instrument void for usury.
The New York court, six months later, unanimously held that a bank pur-
chasing with knowledge of usury could recover nothing,102 reversing the
Appellate Division for holding that the bank was subject only to the penalties
provided in the banking laws. 10 3  These cases, it is submitted, are square
holdings that the holder in due course under the N. I. L. cuts off the defense
of usury. 10 The banking law is important only to show the legislative intent
that banks be treated differently from individuals.
For a short time after these decisions the New York courts held that the
N. I. L. should be broadly construed, so as to protect all holders in due
course, whether banks or not.' 05 It now appears, however, that they are
giving effect to the legislative intent to place banks on a different footing
from individuals and are finding individual holders in due course subject to
the defense 106 though the banks are not; a very delicate adjustment of the
competing legislative policies.
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io6. Sabine v. Paine, 223 N. Y. 401, iI9 N. E. 849, 5 A. L. R. 1444 (1918). The A. L.
R. annotation points out that the plaintiff, though a holder in due course, really took the instru-
ment at its inception and that therefore this case might be distinguished, since the New
INTERPRETATION OF THE N. L L.
B. Capacity
Where statutes make instruments or contracts void and at the same time
limit the capacity of the individual or business unit sought to be bound, a
different situation is created. The N. I. L. has drawn a sharp distinction
between capacity and illegality. Under section 55, illegality becomes a mere
defect of title which is cut off by a holder in due course, but absence of
capacity is a defense which seems to be preserved even against holders in due
course. If this were not so it would be unnecessary for the maker and the
drawer in sections 6o and 61 to admit the capacity of the payee, and for the
acceptor in section 62 to admit the capacity of the drawer and payee. Add
to this the fact that the indorser by section 66 "warrants to all subsequent
holders in due course" "that all prior parties had capacity to contract",1
07
and it is clear that the framers contemplated that incapacity was to be a
defense against subsequent holders in due course.' 0s Whether the statute
declaring instruments void affects capacity or merely declares illegality re-
solves itself simply into an interpretation of the particular act involved.
When this question is answered, if capacity is involved, the N. I. L. is clear:
the holder in due course cannot recover.'0 9 If the statute be one of pro-
hibition only, the court is remitted to the considerations of legislative policy
already discussed.:"'
York decisions hold in such a case that a holder in due course is not protected. See Wein-
stein, When a Bill or Note Represents an Usurious Contract (1931) 5 TUIANE L. REV. 211,
219, but even so the case has properly been followed as standing for the other proposition.
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CORN. L. Q. 44 (i918).
107. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 65 (3).
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HAv. L. Rav. 164. In the case of corporations the question is one of itira vires and the
interpretation of the enabling statute. Henderson v. Farmers Savings Bk., 196 Iowa, 496, 202
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(i9o5) ; Walling v. Cushman, 238 Mass. 62, 13o N. E. 175 (1921).
ino. The question of the effect of the indorsement of one lacking capacity to pass title to
the instrument is beyond the scope of this paper. See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTs LAW § 22;
BRANNAN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 277-280, 683-686.
